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STATE OF UTAH
PILLSBURY MILLS, INC., a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent
vs.
NEPHI PROCESSING PLANT, INC.,
a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant,
and
LAFE MORLEY and CALLIE MORLEY,
his wife,
Cross-Complainants and Respondents.
HOWELL, STINE AND OLMSTEAD
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE APPEAL
The parties to this appeal will hereafter be designated as in the lower court, namely, Pillsbury Mills,
Inc., Respondent here, as the "Plaintiff" or as Pillsbury,
Nephi Processing Plant, Inc., Appellant here, as the
"Defendant" or as Nephi. We do not conceive that Lafe
Morley and Callie Morley, so-called "Cross-complain-
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ants" in the court below, are parties to the proceedings
here, but to the extent reference is made to them they
will be referred to as "Cross-complainants", or as the
Morleys.
In defendant's statement in its brief as to the nature
of the case, the following appears :
"This is an appeal from the judgment entered
against Nephi, the refusal of the trial court to
vacate the judgment, and grant a trial."
The emphasized portion of the foregoing is clearly
erroneous, as there was and is no appeal from the judgment entered in favor of plaintiff against defendant on
February 21, 1957. The notice of appeal filed on July
15, 1957, limits the appeal to the
"order made on the 15th day of June, 1957 * * *
denying defendant's motion to vacate the judgment * * * filed herein on February 21, 1957."
(R. 102)
Thus, the judgment itself is not appealed from,
and is not before the court, but only the question of
whether the lower court erred on the record before it
in entering an order denying defendant's nwtion to
vacate the judgment. In fact the ti1ne for appeal fr01n
the judgment as such had expired long prior to the time
that defendant filed its motion to Yarate the judg1nent.
Observation should also be 1nade of the fact that
subsequent to the denial of the n1otion to Yarate the
judgment, the defendant filed with the lower court a
motion for "rehearing or retrial" of its previous 1notion
to vacate, which the lower court refused to grant on
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August 21, 1957, and from which defendant also purports
to appeal. ( R 82 and 111.)
Upon this phase of the matter, we submit the lower
court was without jurisdiction to entertain the motion
for rehearing or retrial of the previous motion, and
accordingly, no proper appeal could lie from its order
thereon. This by reason of the fact ( 1) the court has
no power to reopen the question of granting a motion
for a new trial after disposing of it, Luke v. Coleman,
38 Utah 383, 113 P. 1023, and (2) the defendant having
theretofore appealed from the original order, it had
by such appeal vested exclusive jurisdiction of the
cause in this court, and the lower court was without
power or authority to further act therein. State v.
Carter, 52 Utah 305, 173 P. 459.
Thus the only question properly before this court
is whether the lower court erred in denying defendant's
motion to vacate the judgment previously entered.

STATE1fENT OF THE CASE
With the nature of the appeal thus identified, a
statement of the case in simple and understandable form
is desirable.
In January, 1953, the ~Iorleys, being raisers of
turkeys, entered into an agreement with plaintiff Pillsbury Mills, for the financing of Morleys 1953 turkey
feed requirements. To secure such financing the Morleys executed a chattel mortgage upon their turkeys in
favor of Pillsbury, which mortgage was properly filed
of record. In November 1953, the defendant, Nephi
Processing Plant, purchased the mortgaged turkeys

3
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from the Morleys. Nephi at that time had actual notice
of Pillsbury's mortgage, and in fact remitted to Pillsbury Forty Three Thousand Seven Hundred T:wentytwo and 08 j100 ( $43,722.08) Dollars of the purchase price
to apply thereon. (Page 4 of Appellant's Brief). A
balance of Two Thousand Six Hundred Seventy-nine
and 16/100 ($2,679.16) Dollars remained owing to Pillsbury. The mortgage, of which Nephi had actual notice,
provided for payment to Pillsbury of the sales proceeds
up to the full amount of the debt. (R 2-3, Ex. A of Complaint). Nephi, without ascertaining from Pillsbury
the full amount of the debt, and without Pillsbury's consent, and prior to the receipt of all of the turkeys, advanced to J\tiorley some Seven Thousand ($7,000.00)
Dollars under the assumption that when the final purchase price was determined there would remain enough
to pay any remaining balance to Pillsbury.
On January 14, 1954, Pillsbury, through its counsel,
advised Nephi that the ~Iorley debt to Pillsbury was
Forty Six Thousand Four Hundred One and 24/100
( $46,401.24) Dollars, less Forty Three Thousand Seven
Hundred Twenty Two and 08/100 ($43,722.08) Dollars
paid, leaving a balance of Two Thousand Six Hundred
Seventy Nine and 16/100 ($2,679.16) Dollars, and requested an accounting of the proceeds from the turkeys.
(Tr. 37 Ex. A.). Nephi replied on January 20, 1954,
advising it was willing to pay Pillsbury the balance of
Two 'l1housand Six Hundred Seventy Nine and 16/100
($2,679.16) Dollars, if the 1forleys authorized it so to do,
hut as Nephi understood there were son1e disputes between Morley and Pillsbury it, Nephi, didn't want to
make the payment without 1Iorley's approval. (Tr.
4
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22-35 Ex. 7). No mention was made by Nephi that it
had previously advanced against the proceeds some
Seven Thousand ($7,000) Dollars to Morley.
Under date of February 11, 1954, Pillsbury through
its counsel, replied by letter to Nephi to the effect that
under the mortgage it was entitled to receive the proceeds up to the amount of Morley's debt to it, and it
expected Nephi, as the purchaser of the turkeys with
notice of the mortgage, to comply with the request for
remittance of the amount still owing. The letter further
advised Nephi that any disputes between Morley and
Pillsbury would be settled by the parties to the dispute, that Nephi should not involve itself therein, and
that unless Nephi remitted the proceeds as provided
in the mortgage, Pillsbury would sue Nephi. (Ex. B).
Nephi did not make the remittance, and on or about
l\Iay 10, 1954, Pillsbury served its complaint on Nephi,
pleading the mortgage, the fact that Nephi had bought
the mortgaged turkeys, had not remitted the proceeds
of the sale as provided in the mortgage, was withholding a portion of the proceeds, and refused to account
to Pillsbury for the same. (R. 1, Complaint). The complaint did not seek a foreclosure of the mortgage, but
only an accounting of the proceeds as provided in the
mortgage. The only parties thereto were Pillsbury Mills,
as plaintiff, and Nephi Processing Plant, Inc. as defendant. The complaint and summons were served upon
_M. L. Harmon, President and General Manager of the
defendant, Nephi Processing Plant.
Following service of the complaint and summons,
Mr. Harmon took the same to Dwight L. l{ing, an

5
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attorney, and arranged for him to represent Nephi
Processing Plant, Inc., the defendant. In this connection
Mr. Harmon testified as follows:

"Q. That is what I'm getting at. You went
to King for the purpose of getting him to represent Nephi Processing Plant in this litigation~
A. Yes sir.
Q. So he was authorized to represent you?
A. He was authorized to take care of it, yes.
Q. I take it that you discussed with him at
that time the merits of Pillsbury's clain1, did you
not?
A. Yes sir.
Q. And discussed with him the matter of the
$2,700.00 for which Pillsbury was seeking judgment~

A. Yes sir.
Q. And it was shortly following that conversation you had with l\Ir. King that the answer
was actually filed in this case, was it not f
A. That I couldn't say.
Q. But you expected it to be filed within the
time permitted by law, did you not?
A. Yes, I did." (Tr. 32-33).
In due course Mr. I{ing, as attorney for defendant,
filed a motion for a change of yenue from \Y eber Count~:
to Juab County. The motion was denied. (R. 3, 5)'.
Thereupon and in due course defendant, Nephi Processing Plant, Inc., through its attorney, l\Ir. I{ing, filed
an answer. By such ans\Yer the defendant alleged that
the Morley turkeys were sold, that it held son1e Two

6
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Thousand Seven Hundred ($2,700.00)Dollars of the
proceeds, and that:

"This defendant claims no interest in said sum
but is unable to determine to whom it belongs and
to whom it should be paid and alleges that both
plaintiff and Lafe Morley and Callie Morley, his
wife, have made demands upon it for the payment
of the funds in its possession.
"That defendant cannot safely pay to either
plaintiff or Lafe Morley or Callie Morley until
it shall have been determined to whom the funds
in defendant's hands belong." (R. 14).
By the prayer of the answer defendant asked the
court to determine to whom the funds belonged, and to
make appropriate orders protecting it as against the
conflicting claims of plaintiff and the Morleys. Defendant, while pleading the conflicting claims of the Morleys,
did not seek to interplead them. Neither did defendant
claim that it had any interest in the money, but expressly disclaimed any interest therein. Thus, by defendant's answer, the sole issue tendered the court was
the determination of rights to the money as between
plaintiff Pillsbury and the Morleys. While admitting
it had the money and had no interest therein, Nephi did
not tender the money into court, has never tendered it,
and has at all times had the use thereof.
Concurrently with the filing of this answer of the
defendant, Nephi Processing Plant, the Morleys, through
Dwight L. King, as their attorney, filed a motion to
intervene and tendered what was denominated as Crosscomplaint against the plaintiff Pillsbury. Plaintiff resisted the motion to intervene, but it was allowed and

7
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the Cross-complaint filed. By the Cross-complaint the
Morleys alleged in substance that Pillsbury had furnished defective feed that reflected itself in the maturing of the turkeys, and asked damages against Pillsbury therefore. (R. 7). Plaintiff Pillsbury in due
course answered, putting in issue the essential allegations. (R. 18).
Thus, as a consequence of this intervention there
became in these proceedings before the lower court what
were in truth and in fact and in law two separate and
distinct actions. The first was strictly between Pillsbury and Nephi with regard to the proceeds from the
sale of the turkeys. The l\Iorleys were not parties to
that action. The second was between the Morleys and
Pillsbury, and involved strictly a claim for damages
against Pillsbury for supplying defective feed. Nephi
Processing Plant was not a party to or involved in any
way in that action. Both Nephi Processing Plant in its
action, and the Morleys in their action, were represented
by the same attorney, Dwight L. King, but there is
nothing on the face of any of the pleadings to indicate
any conflict of interests as between Nephi and the
Morleys, nor is there anything in the record to so indicate.
With the pleadings thus closed, the court in due
course set the actions for trial on February 13, 1957.
Pending arrival of the trial date negotiations for settlement of the quality clailn of the l\lorleys against Pillsbury were had, and a settlen1ent was reached. Nephi
Processing Plant as such was not consulted in those
negotiations, as it was not a party to that action and

8
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-- --~---------~---------had no interest therein. The settlement was effected,
and by stipulation between the Morleys and Pillsbury
the action arising out of the cross-complaint of the
~Iorleys was dismissed (R. 26).
This left only the
original action between Pillsbury and Nephi Processing
Plant for the proceeds· from the sale of the turkeys,
and with respect to which Nephi had disclaimed any
interest. The only issue therein for the lower court to
determine, based upon Nephi's answer, was whether
Nephi should pay these funds to Pillsbury or to the
Morleys.
To solve this issue the Morleys, through their attorney, executed a stipulation, the effect of which
was that the Morleys disclaimed any interest in the
moneys Nephi was holding, that the same should be paid
by Nephi to Pillsbury, and that Pillsbury have judgment therefor. (R. 25).
Thus, upon the answer as filed by Nephi that the
right to the funds was solely between Pillsbury and the
~Iorleys, and the ~Iorleys' stipulation that the funds
should go to Pillsbury, the court on February 21, 1957,
entered judgment against Nephi and in favor of Pillsbury for the sum claimed, namely Two Thousand Six
Hundred Seventy Nine and 16/100 ($2,679.16) Dollars,
with interest. (R. 27).
Notice of the entry of judgment was given by Pillsbury to Nephi on February 21, 1957. (Tr. 26, Ex. 5).
No appeal from the judgment was taken within the
time allowed by law, or at all, but Nephi, after the time
for appeal had elapsed, filed a Inotion to vacate the judgment and set it aside. (R. 29). A rather extended
9
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hearing was had thereon on April 22, 1957, and on June
15, 1957, the court denied the motion. (R. 54). On June
28, 1957, defendant filed a "1\Iotion for Rehearing or
Retrial", (R. 82) and while that motion was pending,
the defendant on July 15, 1957, filed its notice of appeal
to this court. The filing of the appeal to this court,
of course, deprived the lower court of further jurisdiction, and the lower court accordingly denied the then
pending motion for rehearing. (R. 87).
Based upon the foregoing pleadings, and the record
made at the hearing on the motion to vacate the judgment, the defendant now contends that the lo,,·er court
erred as a matter of law in denying the motion to vacate
the judgment.
While this statement of facts is becoming somewhat
extended, it is necessary in order to fully understand
the matter that some further reference be made to the
hearing, and the evidence adduced thereon.
The motion to vacate the judgment, while setting
forth many matters strictly between X ephi and the
Morleys, and with respect to which Pillsbury was not
and could not be concerned, did indirectly at least touch
upon two matters with which the lower court n1ight
properly concern itself in detennining whether Pillsbury's judgment should be set aside. The first is that
Mr. King was never authorized to appear for or represent the defendant Nephi, and the second is that the
judgment was taken without preYion~ notice to Nephi.
With respect to the eontention that "Jir. l{ing was
never authorized to represent Nephi Processing Plant,
we have heretofore quoted the testiluony of 1fr. Harn1on,

10
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President and General 1fanager of the Company, on
cross-examination, with respect to his arranging with
Mr. King to do that very thing. (Tr. 32-33). However,
the further contention is made that the recitals in the
answer to the effect that Nephi had no interest itself
in the fund, was in effect but a stakeholder as between
the conflicting claims of the Morleys and Nephi, is
challenged as being erroneous, not in accordance with
the true facts, and in effect a mistake. On this point
reference is made to the Exhibits 7, 9 and 11 offered and
received at the hearing, and particularly to the letter
Exhibit 7, written by Nephi to counsel for Pillsbury
before the answer was filed, and even before the action
was started. In it it is stated,
"Nephi Processing Plant notified :Mr. Lee Turner
of Pillsbury Co., Ogden, Utah also Pillsbury Co's
office at Los Angeles that they stand ready and
willing to pay Pillsbury Co. for the account of
Lafe Morley $2,679.16 as soon as we receive the
authority from Lafe Morley to do so.
"We do not feel that we should make a payment
on the account of Lafe Morley until we have the
authority from Mr. Morley in writing.
"It is my understanding that Mr. Morley is making some kind of a claim against the Pillsbury
Co. We do not want to be involved in any controversy between these two parties but do have
to clear ouselves in this matter."
The sum and substance of that letter is that Nephi
has the funds, that they are subject to conflicting claims
as between the Morleys and Pillsbury, and that Nephi.
is in effect a stakeholder which does not want to become
involved in that conflict of claims. The answer as filed

11
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does no more than reiterate the sum and substance of
that letter.
Additional evidence introduced in connection with
the hearing further corroborates the factual accuracy
of the answer as filed by Mr. King, that Nephi was but
a stakeholder, and except for the conflicting claim of
the Morleys to the funds, had no defense to Pillsbury's
suit.
Exhibit 11 is a letter from Mr. King, former counsel
for Nephi, to present counsel for Nephi, introduced in
evidence by Nephi on the motion to vacate. In it is
the following statement:
"In regard to your letter of ~I arch 19, 195 7,
concerning my representation of Nephi Processing Plant, the only time that I had any duty
as far as Nephi Processing Plant was concerned,
was to file for them a disclaimer and I furnished
to you heretofore a ·copy of that document which
was filed in the Pillsbury !vfills vs. Nephi Processing Plant case.

"* * *

"The material contained in my answer is what
was furnished to me by ~Ir. Harmon. He advised
me that he had the money from the sale of the
Morley turkeys and that Nephi Processing Plant
had no interest in the money itself, but since
Morley was one of his custmners, he would not
pay to Pillsbury since 1\Iorley had a clain1 for
deficiencies in the feed.
"When I discussed this with hiln, he told me
directly that he still had the n1oney and that he
would not pay it either to 1\lorley or Pillsbury
until they had settled their differences, so that

12
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the processing plant would not be held twice
for the same money."

"* * *
"* * * I know that the money Pillsbury Mills
claimed was due from Nephi Processing Plant on
information which Harmon furnished me was
due it. I could find no reason in any of the
information which I had why that money should
not be paid over by Nephi Processing Plant to
Pills bury Mills."
The affidavit of Mr. King, which affidavit was
considered by the lower court in connection with the
motion to vacate contains the following recitals:
"That the Answer on file in the above entitled
action for Nephi Processing Plant, Inc. was filed
pursuant to a request by M. L. Harmon; that
said Answer sets forth accurately the information
furnished to affiant by M. L. Harmon and is in
effect a disclaimer of any interest in the money
which was the proceeds from certain turkeys sold
by Lafe Morley and Callie Morley, his wife, in
the fall of 1953.
"At no time prior to the filing of the motion to
vacate judgment entered February 18, 1957, was
affiant ever informed of any defense that Nephi
Processing Plant, Inc. had to the claim of Pillsbury Mills, Inc., a corporation. That affiant has
disecussed with M. L. Harmon and with counsel
for Nephi Processing Plant, Inc., Udell R. Jensen,
the matter of the claim of Pillsbury Mills, Inc.,
a corporation, against Nephi Processing Plant,
Inc. and has never been informed by either of
said persons of any substantial defense that
Nephi Processing Plant, Inc. could have or had
to the claim of Pillsbury Mills, Inc., a corporation.
13
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"That affiant filed the Answer requested by l\1.
L. Harmon and forwarded a copy of said Answer
to M. L. Harmon under date of l\fay 13, 1955;
that nothing was thereafter stated by 1\I. L. Harmon concerning the Answer filed and no acception
(sic) or objection was taken of it. That said
Answer is in effect a disclaimer on the part of
Nephi Processing Plant, Inc. of any interest in
the proceeds from the sale of the Lafe ~Iorley
birds in the fall of 1953."
Still further, in an affidavit made by :Mr. Jensen,
present counsel for Nephi, he quotes -:\Ir. King as having
stated that on or about l\Iarch 13, 1955, he wrote the
defendant Nephi a letter, stating in part as follows:
"Judge Norseth finally got off his seat and ruled
that the Pillsbury Mills case was properly brought
in Weber County. I have, therefore, answered
on your behalf and filed a cross complaint against
Pillsbury Mills on behalf of Lafe l\forley and
his wife. Enclosed herewith you
find a
copy of the answer which has been filed."

''ill

Disregarding the reference to the trial judge, the
important thing is that this affidavit of Mr. Jensen's
disclosed to Judge N orseth, who had the duty of ruling
on the motion to vacate, that ~Ir. King claimed to have
forwarded to Nephi Processing Plant, over a year and
a half before the trial setting, a copy of the answer he
had filed on behalf of Nephi.
The second point is that Nephi had no notice of
the taking of the judg1nent, and the proceedings leading
up to it. There is no doubt but that fr01n the tin1e ~Ir.
King appeared in the action as attorney for Nephi (for
which we have seen Nephi arranged), that all 1natters

14
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pertaining to the action as they concerned Nephi were
handled with :Mr. King, as Nephi's attorney, and no
attempt was made to go around him and deal with
Nephi directly. He was the attorney of record fo·r
Nephi, no information was ever brought to the attention
of Pillsbury or its attorneys that he was not doing the
job assigned to him by Nephi, and under the circumstances he was the only one with whom Pillsbury and
its attorneys could properly deal.
ARGU:M:ENT
In defendant's introductory statement to its argument (Page 16 of defendant's brief), a statement is
made with which we must take issue, as it goes to the
heart of this appeal. The statement is
"The real dispute arose between Pillsbury and
the l\Iorleys as to whether Morleys owed Pillsbury or Pillsbury owed Morleys on their transaction. Without any notice to or information
received by Nephi, Pillsbury and Morleys settled
their differences between themselves ; and they
then stipulated without notice to Nephi judgment be entered in favor of Pillsbury and against
Nephi for the debt of Morleys."
The error in the statement arises from the emphasized words "on their transaction", inferring that these
proceedings involved but one transaction as between
Pillsbury and Morley, rather than two. The first transaction was under the mortgage, and involved solely the
question of the balance owing on the feed account. No
one has disputed, including Nephi as well as the Morleys,
that this balance was $2,679.16. The only question in-

15
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volved was whether Nephi was in funds, the proceeds
of Morley's turkeys, which should be paid over to
Pillsbury in discharge of the debt.
The second transaction involved the quality of the
feed sold by Pillsbury to Morleys, and whether ~Iorleys
had been damaged thereby. Nephi was in no wise concerned therein.
The true question here is whether Pillsbury and the
Morleys could settle this quality claim between themselves, and, having settled that, could agree between
themselves that the funds in Nephi's possession be paid
over to Pillsbury.
The mere statement of the proposition provides the
necessary affirmative answer. As Nephi was not involved in the quality dispute, it had no concern therein
nor with the settlement thereof. As it had pleaded in
its answer that it had no interest in the funds representing the proceeds from the sale Qf the turkeys, and which
but confirmed its previous letter to Pillsbury concerning the funds (Ex. 7), it could not be to its detriment
that the Morleys and Pillsbury agreed as to their disposition.
Further than that, however, if it be suggested that
Nephi was entitled to prior notice, a suggestion we
categorically reject, it cannot be denied that Xephi did
in fact have that notice, as everything that was done
was consummated through the participation of ~Ir. I~ing,
who was Nephi's attorney in the proceedings.
With this prelin1inary statmnent we will now answer
defendant's seven points of argun1ent seri:ati1n.
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POINT I.
THIS IS NOT AN ACTION TO RECOVER A DEBT
OR FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF A RIGHT
SECURED BY MORTGAGE
The complaint filed herein by the plaintiff Pillsbury
against the defendant Nephi, was not to foreclose a
mortgage, or to enforce any right secured by mortgage.
The complaint was for an accounting upon the sales
proceeds of mortgaged property, and for the payment
thereof to plaintiff. The mortgage was attached to
the complaint as an exhibit, as it embodied the agreements under which the right of Pillsbury to the possession of the proceeds arose.
The mortgage agreement by its terms provided for
the sale of the mortgaged turkeys by the mortgagors.
This was done. It further provided that the proceeds
of the sale should come to Pillsbury for application
upon its debt. Nephi had the whole of the proceeds,
and paid over a part of them to Pillsbury as provided
in the mortgage agreement. It declined to pay the
balance, albeit admitting it had possession thereof. The
action was for the recovery of the possession of those
funds.
Actually, at the time the action was brought, there
was no property upon which foreclosure could be had.
The mortgaged property had long since been sold and
disposed of by mutual consent of the mortgagors and
mortgagee. All that remained was the proceeds from
the sale, and the parties, by agreement set out in the
mortgage instrument, had provided for the manner of
handling the same. This action was to enforce those
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agreed rights as against a third person admittedly in
possession of the subject funds, and with full knowledge
of plaintiff's right thereto under the mortgage agreement.
The statue quoted by defendant to the effect that
there can be but one action for the recovery of any debt
secured by mortgage has no application to a situation
such as this where the chattels that constitute the security have been sold by mutual agreement of the
mortgagor and mortgagee, or have been otherwise extinguished or exhausted. As stated in Security First
National Bank v. Chapman, (Calif.) 87 P. (2) 724:
"Where mortgaged property has been destroyed
or sold and is no longer in existence, so far as the
mortgagee is concerned, there is little doubt that
a personal action may be maintained without
going through the empty form of foreclosing the
mortgage."
We further submit that the point here raised by
defendant is not one available to it even though the
turkeys had not all been sold, as it is a defense that
would at most be available to the n1ortgagors.
To suggest, as defendant does in the last sentence
of his argument under this point that the judgn1ent
against Nephi should be vacated and the trial court directed to proceed to adjudicate the a1nounts owing between the mortgagor and mortgagee is to suggest not
only an iinpossible, but a useless proceeding. It is impossible, because there is no action pending between
the mortgagor and the Inortgagee in which the sa1ne
may be adjudicated, and never was with relationship
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to the balance owing the mortgagee under the mortgage
agreement. It is useless, as the mortgagor and mortgagee have themselves determined this question by the
stipulation filed in this action to the effect that the
$2,769.16 plus interest, in defendant's possession be paid
over to plaintiff Pillsbury.
POINT II.
DEFENDANT WAS AT ALL TIMES REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL IN THE ACTION IN THE
COURT BELOW, AND SUCH COUNSEL HAD FULL
AUTHORITY TO PLEAD AS HE DID.
Defendant here asserts three propositions as follows: That there was no notice from Mr. King, defendant's attorney, to defendant,
(a) That he had filed a Motion for Change of Venue,
(b) That he had filed an answer in the name of defendant,
(c) That he had in Nephi's name pleaded that Nephi
held $2,700.00 of proceeds from the sale of
Morleys turkeys.
As to (a) above, the filing of such a motion was
but a procedural matter, which was certainly within
general scope of an attorney's authority. Regardless
of that, however, the motion was denied by the court'
so no prejudice did nor could result to defendant.
As to (b) above, defendant's President and General
1\lanager testified that he arranged with Mr. King for
the latter to represent defendant in this action, and expected him in due course to file an answer on its behalf
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(Tr. 32-33). It now seems a little ridiculous for defendant to claim to this court that having secured Mr. King's
services to represent it and file an answer on its behalf,
that there was some duty on Mr. King's part to notify
Nephi that he had done the very thing he was employed
to do. He was employed to file an answer, and he did
file an answer, so no prejudice resulted whether Nephi
was notified that he had done so, or otherwise. Further
than that, Mr. King's affidavit that appears in the record
(R. 41) discloses that he did in fact notify the defendant, and in fact forwarded defendant a copy of the
answer as filed.
As to (c) above, that defendant was not specifically
advised as to the contents of the answer, there is a
conflict. Mr. King states by his affidavit (R. 42) that
promptly upon its filing he forwarded a copy by mail
to the defendant. Mr. Harmon, President of defendant,
and Mr. Steele, its Secretary-Treasurer, disavowed that
either of them ever saw it prior to the entry of judgment. To the extent that the lower court considered that
question material, it resolved the conflict against the
defendant by denying the motion to vacate.
However, we submit the question is wholly immaterial because the answer as filed, namely, that Nephi
held the funds pending determination of the conflicting claims thereto of Pillsbury and the ~Iorleys, is in
accordance with the facts.
Nephi Processing Plant, in its letter of January 20,
1954, acknowledged that it would pay Pillsbury for the
account of the Morleys, the sum of $~,G79.16 as and when
the Morleys further authorized it so to do (Ex. 7). That
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letter was written prior to the bringing of the action,
and was in response to the letter of Mr. Olmstead, on
behalf of Pillsbury, to Nephi, dated January 14, 1954
(Ex. A). That letter of defendant, in the light of the
one it responded to, is subject to no construction but
that Nephi held a balance of proceeds from the sale
of Morleys turkeys, that it claimed no interest therein,
and would pay them over to Pillsbury or to the Morleys
as their respective rights were determined.
Further, Mr. Harmon, President of the defendant
company, testified that at the time of the sale of the
turkeys he knew they were subject to Pillsbury's mortgage, that defendant had possession of all of the proceeds
therefrom, that Pillsbury was claiming the right to all
of the proceeds under the provisions of the mortgage,
and that defendant made partial remittances to Pillsbury (Tr. 34). Knowing of the existence of the mortgage, he also knew that under the terms thereof either
Pillsbury or :Morley was entitled to the balance of the
proceeds. Under the circumstances, if there was a dispute between Pillsbury and the Morleys, defendant could
be no more than a stakeholder, which is precisely what
Mr. King pleaded.
In this connection we are not unmindful that Nephi
is now claiming that Morley was indebted to it (a point
the Morley's apparently deny (R. 43) and that if it
were established that the sales proceeds belonged to the
:Morleys it might have offset the same against the
N1orley debt. That, however, has nothing to do with
Nephi's position as a stakeholder of the funds. Those
funds belonged either to Pillsbury or Morley, and with
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respect to those funds as such Nephi had no interest
in them. If in fact Morley had a right thereto superior
to that of Pillsbury, and if at that time Morley was indebted to Nephi, it might be that Nephi could use the
funds in its possession as an offset against the Morley
debt, but that right, if it existed, would not be based
upon any interest of Nephi in the fund, but purely upon
a future right of offset..
Finally, under this point, defendant makes grave
assertions against Mr. King, a member of this Bar,
charging him not only with carlessness and negligence,
but with breach of his duty to his client, and breaches
of the canons of ethics.
It is not our purpose here to defend l\Ir. King's
. actions in this case, as such is not our responsibility.
He was engaged by defendant to represent defendant;
and whether he did a good or a bad job of it is not for
us to say, as we were on the other side. We do feel,
however, that we would be remiss if we did not make
some general observations with regard to the undisputed facts.
At the time defendant e1nployed ~fr. King to represent it, it knew that ~Ir. King was attorney for the
Morleys. It knew that the ~Iorleys were adversary to
Pillsbury insofar as the funds in Nephi's possession
are concerned. It further believed that the l\Iorleys
were then indebted to Nephi. Nothing in that connection was in anywise concealed, and with full lmowledge of all of those facts it chose ~fr. I{ing to represent
it. In fact ~Ir. Hannon testified that he didn't think
Nephi needed much representation (R. 32), that it was
22

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

primarily the l\Iorleys' concern, and that he went to
King because l\Iorley suggested it. All of this but further confirms that Nephi didn't have any interest in the
controversy other than to protect itself against paying
the money to the wrong party, and that is what it wanted
of l\Ir. King.
Now defendant charges that Mr. King mispleaded
the facts, which from the record it is clear he did not
do, and that he abandoned Nephi in its defense, which
he didn't, as the only defense Nephi had was that it
didn't want to pay the money to the wrong party, and
it was fully protected in that regard at all times.
Finally, it is suggested that the pleading was a
nullity as it constituted a confession of judgment, which
requires express, rather than implied authority on the
part of defendant's attorney.
On this subject generally the law is far from being
as clear as counsel would have the court believe. Counsel
quotes at Page 25 of its brief from 5 Am. Jur. Attorneys
at Law, Sec. 101. He didn't, however, quote the first
sentence of the section as follows:

"It is quite generally conceded that the control
of the attorney, as such, over the conduct of the
cause impliedly authorizes him to bind his client
by a confession of, or consent to, judgment, and
by his consent to orders and judgments made in
the progress of a cause and intended to promote
the interests of his client."
Be that as it may, however, it is not pertinent to
the present situation, as what we are here concerned
with is not a confession of judgment, but a disclaimer.
23
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What Mr. King pleaded was that Nephi had no interest
in the funds as such, which was true beyond peradventure
of doubt, and that it wanted protection only in the
matter of to whom it paid the funds-Pillsbury or the
Morleys. Certainly that pleading was "intended to
promote the interests of his client" Nephi, and was a
factually accurate pleading of Nephi's relationship to
the fund. What he did later in stipulating for payment
of the fund to Pillsbury he did as attorney for the
Morleys-a position Nephi at all times knew he held
-and tended merely to solve the problem Nephi wanted
solved, namely, who, as between Pillsbury and the
Morleys, should be paid by Nephi.
POINT III.
THE ANSWER FILED BY DEFENDANT WAS A
VALID AND EFFECTIVE PLEADIXG.
Under Point III defendant makes the astonishing
assertion that because of conflicting interests between
the defendant and cross-complainants the defendant's
answer is of no effect. While it 1nay be true that an
attorney may be subject to criticism for representing
conflicting interests, it is a novel suggestion that a
pleading filed by him under those circrnnstances is "ithout effect in an action brought by a third party.
Here the action was brought by Pillsbury against
Nephi. Nephi, being fully advised of !Iorleys' interest
in the outcome of the action, nevertheless voluntaril~-,
intentionally and deliberately elected to be represented
by one it knew to be attorney for the ..Jiorleys in other
matters. Morleys were not parties to this action, but
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the 1\forleys were nevertheless the ones Nephi wanted to
protect. This is the explanation that is given as to why
it went to the 1\Iorleys' attorney.
Morleys then brought an action against Pillsbury,
which action is wholly separate and distinct from the
one Pillsbury brought against Nephi. It might have been
brought in a separate proceeding, but with the consent
of the court it was brought in the pending action by
way of intervention. Nephi was not a party to the
second action, nor did it have any interest in its outcome.
How it can sincerely be urged that because of King's
bringing that action and prosecuting it to settlement
there developed such a conflict of interests as to negate
his representation of Nephi in the action brought by
Pillsbury, is something we just can't understand. Nephi
wanted :Morley to intervene, and wanted King to represent the JHorleys in that intervention. Mr. Harmon
testified (Tr. 32) in response to a question with regard
to the filing of the answer,
"A. 1\lr. King wquld file that on behalf of the
Nephi Processing Plant and the Morleys."
If there was in fact a conflict of interests between Nephi
and the Morleys, and the record thoroughly demonstrates the contrary, it arose subsequent to the filing
of Nephi's answer and the intervention of the lVIorleys,
and was something of which Mr. King was not informed
-as 1\lr. Harmon testified (Tr. 26) there was no further
contact with l\Ir. King after his original employment.
Certainly it could not give rise under any circumstances
to a preinise for invalidating Pillsbury's judgment.
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We submit that defendant's third point of argument
is without any merit whatever.
POINT IV.
DEFENDANT HAD NOTICE OF ALL PROCEEDINGS, WAS REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AND
HAD ITS DAY IN COURT.
Defendant here asserts that Morleys' ~lotion to
Intervene was not served upon it, that Morleys' Crosscomplaint was not served upon defendant, Pillsbury's
answer to the cross-complaint was not served upon the
defendant, notice of the trial setting 'vas not served
upon it, the stipulation for judgment was not served
upon it, and the stipulation for dismissal of 1\Iorleys'
cross-complaint was not served upon it. All this is
claimed to be in violation of Rule 5 (a), e.C.P., which
provides in substance that the service of all pleadings,
motions, etc., shall be upon each party affected thereby.
While quoting in its brief the substance of Rule 5
(a), defendant omits to refer to Rule 5 (b) which provides in part :
"Whenever under these rules serYice is required
to be made upon a party represented by an attorney, the service shall be n1ade upon the
attorney • • • ."
In considering this phase of the nmtter it is to be
remembered that Nephi, the defendant, and :Jiorley, the
cross-complainant against plaintiff, had the smne attorney, and it was deliberately arranged by ~Ir. Harn10n,
President of the defendant cOinpany, that the defendant
be represented by one whmn he knew to be ~Iorleys'
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attorney. With this in n1ind we will review the record
on the matters referred to by defendant.
(1) The motion of the Morleys to intervene. This
motion was served upon l\{r. Olmstead, Attorney for
Pillsbury, but not otherwise. Defendant as such was
not served. The motion to intervene by its terms reflects its sole purpose as being the filing of a crosscomplaint against the plaintiff alone. The rights of
the defendant would not be affected by the granting
or denial of the motion, and we submit that service upon
defendant was not required under Rule 5 (b). Further
than that, defendant had the same attorney as the
Morleys, and under Rule 5 (b) where a party is represented by an attorney, service shall be made upon the
attorney, not the party.

Certainly an attorney who represents two parties
in a pending action, and who files a motion on behalf
of one, need not serve himself as attorney for the other.
The purpose of the service requirements is to keep the
attorneys for the parties fully informed, and where an
attorney himself files a pleading he need not serv~
himself in order to have notice thereof.
(2) The Cross-complaint. What we have said under
(1) above, applies with equal force here. The crosscomplaint was against plaintiff alone. Defendant was
not a party thereto, and not affected thereby. The attorney for the defendant was the same as the attorney
for the cross-complainants, and Rule 5 does not require
that under those circumstances an attorney serve himself.

( 3) Pillsbury's answer to the cross-complaint. Pills-
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bury's answer to the cross-complaint was served upon
the cross-complainants through their attorney. Defendant was not a party thereto, and not affected thereby.
To the extent, if any, to which defendant was entitled
to notice, which we deny, notice to Mr. King, upon whom
a copy of the answer was served, was notice to defendant,
his client.
( 4) Notice of the trial setting. Notice of the trial
setting was given to all parties, through their respective
attorneys, which is in compliance with the rules. However, in view of the manner in which the matter was
ultimately disposed of, the matter of such notice is purely
academic.
( 5) The stipulation for judgment. This stipulation
was prepared by Mr. King, and signed by him as attorney for cross-complainants. He was also attorney
for defendant, and so had notice in such capacity of what
he was doing in his capacity as attorney for the ~Iorleys.
Whether he should have discussed the matter further
with the defendant we express no opinion, as that is
not involved in the point under discussion, namely, the
matter of notice under Rule 5. \Ye do say that any
such discussion would be of no consequence, as defendant had pleaded and so represented to the court and to
plaintiff that it had no interest in the funds which were
the subject of the stipulation, and wanted only to pay
them over to the party, Pillsbury or J.\!Iorleys, entitled
thereto. The stipulation agreeing for payn1ent to Pillsbury served only to solve the quandry defendant felt
itself in.
(6) The stipulation for dismissal of the cross-com-
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plaint. As we have previously noted, the cross-complaint

The
was solely between the 1Iorleys and plaintiff.
Morleys brought it, and with the consent of the plaintiff
could dismiss it. Defendant was not a party thereto,
and its consent to dismissal was not required. If it was
entitled to notice, which we deny as it was not affected
thereby, it had such notice by reason of the fact that
the attorney that represented it was a signatory thereto.
We submit that there is no merit to any contention
based upon lack of notice under Rule 5.
POINT V.
THIS IS NOT A PROPER CASE FOR RELIEF BY
WAY OF VACATING THE JUDG~IENT UNDER
RULE 60 (b)
It is uncontroverted in this record that in the fall

of 1953 when the Morleys brought their turkeys to
Nephi Processing Plant for processing and sale that
Nephi knew they were subject to rnortgage to Pillsbury,
and that in fact Nephi did remit to Pillsbury by two
checks (Tr. 17) in excess of $43,000.00, (Tr. 30), which
but for $2,679.16 covered the Morleys obligation to Pillsbury. However, Nephi claims that when the toms were
to come in, which were the last of Morleys' birds,
Morleys represented to it that there would be enough
toms to finish paying Pillsbury, with some $7,000.00
over. Based upon this representation, and without
checking with Pillsbury as to the amount of its debt,
and without checking to determine how many toms were
actually left, Nephi advanced to 11orley $7,000.00 against
what it anticipated to be surplus. This was done while
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fully cognizant of the fact that if there were not in fact
sufficient proceeds to liquidate the Pillsbury debt, in
the light of the $7,000.00 advance to Morleys, Nephi
would have to nevertheless account to Pillsbury for the
balance of the debt (Tr. 19, 41). Later it developed
that there were insufficient birds to pay the $2,679.16
balance owing Pillsbury, and to offset the $7,000.00 advance to Morleys, by some $3,887.25, so on February 1,
1954, Nephi took the Morleys' note for $6,012.58, representing the $3,887.25 excess advance above referred to,
and $2,135.33, that they had owed Nephi from the year
previous (Tr. 9, 10, 12).
Morley's note for $6,012.58, dated February 1, 1954,
was not by its terms due until December 31, 1954, so
even if the funds in Nephi's possession belonged to
Morley, which they couldn't in the light of the mortgage
agreement, they were not then subject to set off against
the Morley note, because the note wasn't due. Hence,
there is small wonder that Nephi wrote to :Mr. Olmstead
(Ex. 7) advising that it was "ready and willing to pay
to Pillsbury for the account of Lafe ~Iorley $2,679.16
as soon as we receive the authority frmn Lafe Morley
so to do", or that Mr. King, when the transaction was
explained to him, pleaded in behalf of Nephi that Nephi
had no interest in the funds, but wanted only directions
as to whether to pay them to Pillsbury or to the 1\Iorleys.
Now defendant claims surprise and excusable neglect in that Mr. King pleaded these facts on its behalf,
and claims the lower court connnitted reversable error
in not vacating the judgn1ent and pern1itting it to file
an amended answer which, on the face of the record, is
patently sham and frivolous.
30

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

----·----------------------------..........................

~~~

The sum and substance of the tendered amended
answer, and which defendant now contends contains
its "n1eritorious defense", is that the Morleys, by their
quality claim against Pillsbury, had the right to offset,
the same against the balance owing Pillsbury on the
feed account under the mortgage; that having settled the
quality claim without taking into account the mortgage
balance, this mortgage balance is nevertheless wiped
out and defendant, who is not a party to any of those
matters, is thereby discharged insofar as plaintiff is
concerned with respect to the proceeds from the sale
of the Morley turkeys.
In other words, and to get the meat of the matter,
the proposition is that Pillsbury and the Morleys, who
were the only persons involved, had no right to settle
Morleys' claim against Pillsbury for asserted damages
arising out of the quality of feed sold by Pillsbury to
the Morleys, without taking into account in the settlement the balance owing by the J\Iorleys for the feed.
There can be no merit in such contention. Pillsbury and
the Morleys were dealing at arms length, and they had
the right and were free to compromise their differences
as they mutually agreed. If they wanted to settle them
piecemeal, they were free so to do. If they wanted to
settle the quality claim and get that behind them, before
concluding the matter of the feed account, there was
nothing to prevent them doing so. The quality claim
was initiated by the J\Iorleys by way of intervention and
it could be disposed of by voluntary dismissal. Defendant was not a party to it, and certainly can't complain
that the Morleys who originally filed it, subsequently
elected to dismiss it.
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By the same token, defendant having not only
pleaded, but acknowledged in its testimony, that it
possessed funds from the mortgaged turkeys over and
beyond those remitted to Pillsbury, and having acknowledged that but for its own carelessness and neglect
it would not have over advanced to the Morleys against
anticipated surplus funds, and having acknowledged
that it knew when it made the advance to the 1Iorleys
that the advance was against mortgaged birds and that
if it over advanced it must nevertheless account to Pillsbury, and having acknowledged that it now holds Morleys
note for the full amount of what Morley owes it, and
still withholds from Pillsbury proceeds from the sale
of the mortgaged turkeys, it is difficult to conceive of
any meritorious defense to Pillsbury's claim against it,
much less the one set forth in the proposed amended
answer.
Finally, we come to a consideration of the true
significance of Rule 60 (b), under which the defendant
seeks to invoke the aid of the court. At page 36 of
defendant's brief is a partial quotation from this Court's
decision in the case of Chrysler z:. Chrysler, 5 Utah (2)
415, 303 P. ( 2) 995. We quote further therefrom:
"It will be found, howen~r. that these cases are
predicated upon the hypothesis that there has
been some mistake or excusable neglect on the
part of the movant frmn which, in justice and
equity, he should be relieYed. The pertinent inquiry here is whether plaintiff 1net that requirement."
As heretofore pointed out, the sole question on this
appeal is whether the lower court erred in denying
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defendant's motion to vacate the judgment previously
entered, a motion invoking the sound discretion of the
trial court in the light of the facts as they were then
made to appear. Rule 60 (b) in its provisions for relief
from a judg1nent, is not dissimilar to former Section
104-14-4, so far as the latter dealt with this subject. The
position of this court in the matter of review of the
trial court's ruling on such a motion has been stated on
several occasions. In Thomas v. Morris, 8 Utah 284, 31
P. 446, the rule was thus stated:
"The statute is very broad, and under it the
granting or refusing of an application to set
aside a judgment taken by default or rendered
upon a hearing in the absence of one of the
parties, through 'his mistake' inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,' is, by the express
terms of the statute, vested in the court, and its
action will not be disturbed on appeal, unless
an abuse of discretion is shown."
And in .Jfc Whirter vs. Donaldson, et al., 36 Utah 293,
104 P. 731:
"The general rule is that a motion to vacate a
judgment entered by default on the ground of
excusable neglect and permit the party against
whom it is entered to plead to the merits is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and,
unless it is made to appear that such discretion
has been abused, the ruling of the court in vacating or refusing to vacate the judgment will not
be disturbed on appeal."
Further in the Me Whirter case, supra, the court said:
"In order for a party to bring a case within the
provisions of Section 3005, Comp. Laws 1907, he
33
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must show that he has used due diligence to
prepare and present his defense, and that he
was either prevented from doing so because of
some accident, misfortune, or circumstance over
which he has no control; or that he has been
misled or lulled into inaction by some agreement
or act of the opposite party or his counsel upon
which he had a right to rely. This appellant has
wholly failed to do."
From the foregoing it is apparent that the determination of the lower court in a matter such as this is controlled by certain considerations, namely, (1) there must
be some mistake or excusable neglect on the part of
the movant from which he ought to be relieved, ( 2) he
has used due diligence to present his defense, ( 3) he
has been prevented from so doing because of some
accident, misfortune or circumstance over which he has
no control, or has been misled or lulled into inaction by
some act of the opposite party or counsel upon which
he had a right to rely, and, ( 4) granting the motion
would be in furtherance of justice. The action of the
lower court in granting or denying such a motion will
not be disturbed by this court unless there has been a
"manifest abuse of discretion."
With these rules in mind, consideration may be
given to the ruling of the lower court on the record
before it.
( 1) No mistake or excusable neglect on the part of
the defendant was shown. The "1nistake and neglect"
attempted to be relied upon is that defendant pleaded
in its answer that it had the funds, had no interest
therein, and wanted protection only in the matter of

34

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to whom to make payment. That pleading was not a
mistake, but on the record reflects the true facts. While
defendant may urge that it was a mistake for its attorney to plead the truth, such of course, is not th'e
type of mistake to which the rule has reference.
(2) Upon the matter of diligence, the record shows,
and it is a record that was largely made by the defendant, that upon being served with summons, it took the
same to Attorney King and arranged that he represent
it (Tr. 32-33); it advised 1\Ir. King that it had the
$2,679.16 proceeds from the turkeys, had no interest
therein, and wanted only to pay it to the party, Pillsbury or Morley, properly entitled thereto, (Exhibits 9
and 11 and Affidavit of Mr. King. R. 41). These are
the facts, and the only facts, that were disclosed by
defendant to its attorney, notwithstanding defendant
received a copy of the answer as filed.
(3) No contention has ever been made that defendant has been misled or lulled into inaction by plaintiff,
who was and is the only other party to the proceeding.
Plaintiff not only warned defendant of its intention to
bring suit, but also warned defendant against injecting
itself into any disputes between plaintiff and the Morleys, and particularly advised defendant that any such
disputes would be "settled by the parties themselves
directly." (Exhibit B).
(4) Nor could the vacation of the judgment be in
"furtherance of justice", but on the contrary justice
is served only by preserving the judgment as entered.
The funds in Nephi's possession came from the sale of
Morleys' turkeys, and belonged either to the 1\Iorleys,
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the owners, or to Pillsbury, the mortgagee thereof. N ephi, nor any one else had any right thereto. :Morleys
and Pillsbury, the only ones concerned, agreed that
they should go to Pillsbury. Justice certainly would
not be served by re-litigating a question upon which
the only interested parties have agreed.
POINT VI.
THE JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT BE VACATED
FOR ANY ALLEGED ABSENCE OF FINDINGS OR
FAILURE TO DISPOSE OF :MATERIAL ISSrES.
The point here is made, among others, that Rules
12 (d) and 56 (c) were not complied with. Rule 12 (d)
concerns itself with the procedure for disposing of a
motion for judgment on the pleadings, and Rule 56 (c)
with motions for summary judgment. K either are here
pertinent, as neither type of question \Yas here involved.
Here the pleadings reflected a claim by plaintiff
against the defendant for certain funds, the disclaimer
by the defendant of any interest therein, and the assertion by the defendant that there \Yas involved conflicting rights to the funds as between plaintiff and the
Morleys. Hence, on the pleadings, the only n1aterial
issue was whether defendant should pay the funds
over to Pillsbury or to the ~Iorleys. The trial court
was saved the burden of determining that by the stipulation of the Morleys that they be paid to plaintiff.
Had defendant theretofore tendered the uwney into
court, an appropriate order could have been 1nade for
payment over to plaintiff. As defendant had not n1ade
such tender, however, and still had possession of the
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funds, the only appropriate order that could have been
made was that which the Court did make, namely, judgment in favor of plaintiff against defendant.
The other point here made is that the lower court
failed to make findings of fact. There appear to be a
number of complete answers to this contention.
Rule 52 (b) provides that except in actions for
divorce, findings are waived by a failure to appear at
the time of trial, and the defendant here did not so
appear, albeit it had notice through its attorney of all
proceedings.
Another answer lies in the fact that there were no
unresolved issues of fact upon which the court might
make findings, and findings are required only with respect to material issues. The material issues raised by
plaintiff's complaint were all admitted by defendant in
its answer, and the only issue raised by defendant was
to whom, as between plaintiff and the Morleys, it should
pay the money. This was settled by the stipulation of
the Morleys that it should go to plaintiff.
This court in the case of I. X. L. Stores v. Moon, 49
Utah 262, 162 P. 622, stated the rule as follows:
"The contention that the court erred in failing to
make a finding upon defendant's vlea of payment
is not tenable. While it is true that findings
should be made upon all material issues, yet in
a case where the facts are stipulated, and it is
clear that upon those facts the plaintiff cannot
recover upon other grounds than that of payment,
such a finding is immaterial."
The contention that the lower court failed to dispose
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of material issues as between plaintiff and defendant is
likewise without merit. The only issues between these
parties were ( 1), did defendant have possession of
proceeds from the mortgaged turkeys, and (2), if so,
should it pay them over to plaintiff or to Morley. The
first was resolved by the admission of defendant in its
answer that it did hold such proceeds, and the second
was resolved by agreement between plaintiff and the
Morleys. There were no material issues undisposed of.
POINT VII.
NEITHER PLAINTIFF'S JUDGl\IENT OF FEBRUARY 18, 1957, NOR THE ORDER DIS~IISSING
THE CROSS-COMPLAINT SHOULD BE VACATED.
Defendant's argument here is extremely difficult
to follow or to understand. The statement is made at
the outset that "unless relief was granted to defendant
against the Morleys herein its claim against the ~Iorleys
would probably be res adjudicata and defendant have no
relief".
The judgment under attack is a judgn1ent in favor
of Pillsbury and against Nephi Processing Plant. The
Morleys are not parties to the judgment, and were not
parties to the action. Vacating this judg1nent is not
going to give defendant any relief against the :Jiorleys,
as they have no interest in the action, and by their
stipulation, no interest in the subject thereof.
The defendant by its own testin10ny holds the prmnissory note of the Morleys, which evidences the debt
owed by the Morleys to the defendant, and whether
this judgment is vacated or sustained cannot in any way,
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either favorably or adversely, affect Morleys' obligation
to defendant under that note. What the situation may
be as to pending litigation referred to in defendant's
brief, between Lafe Morley, Ray Nielsen and M. L.
Harmon, none of whom are parties hereto, and with
respect to which litigation we are wholly uninformed,
is not apparent, but whatever the status of that litigation
may be it has nothing to do with the present case.
Defendant asserts that "in fairness defendant is
entitled to file a proper claim herein against the Morleys
and to be heard thereon". This Pillsbury has never
denied, nor in anywise sought to influence. We suppose
that after the Morleys intervened that the defendant
might, had it elected so to do, have cross-complained
against the l\Iorleys on the note, or on any other claim
it might have had, but it didn't do so, and vacating the
Pillsbury judmgent will not reinstate any such right as
the Morleys are not now involved in this action.
Certainly if Nephi holds a bonafide note of the
Morleys it may bring suit thereon against the Morleys
without regard to anything involved in the present case.
What defenses the Morleys may have we do not know,
but certainly the fact that Pillsbury has a judgment
against Nephi will not or cannot be one of them.

CONCLUSION
The single question for determination by this court
is whether there was a manifest abuse of discretion by
the lower court in denying defendant's motion to vacate
the judgment.
We have seen that under plaintiff's

39

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

mortgage it was entitled to receive the proceeds from
the sale of the turkeys to an amount of $2,679.16 over
that paid to it, and that defendant at all times knew of
plaintiff's rights in this regard. Notwithstanding plaintiff's rights, defendant nevertheless and in complete
disregard thereof refused to pay over to plaintiff prQ-;
ceeds from the sale of the mortgaged property. Nothing
can change the fact that as between plaintiff and defendant the defendant was at all times legally liable
to account to the plaintiff for that $2,679.16, and justice
would not be furthered by further litigation of these
issues between these parties.
The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,
HOWELL, STINE AND OLl\ISTEAD
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2324 Adams Avenue
Ogden, Utah
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